Cooperative functions in safety-critical System-of-Systems scenarios



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Introduction [Hans Hansson, MDH]




- Facing design and assurance challenges of security-informed safety critical vehicle platoons via FLAR2SAF [Irfan Sljivo, MDH]
- CO-CPS: A sample XSTAMPP usage in V2I traffic management scenario based on STAMP model [Leonardo Napolitano, RO Technology]
- Panel/Discussion [Sasi Punnekkat, MDH]





Cooperative functions?







Systems-of-systems (SoS)

Characterization by Maier¹

- 1. Operational independence of the elements. The constituent systems can operate independently in a meaningful way, and are useful in their own right.
- 2. Managerial independence of the elements. The constituent systems not only can operate independently, but they do operate independently even while being part of the SoS. They are acquired separately.
- **3. Evolutionary development**. The SoS does not appear fully formed, and functions and purposes are added based on experience.
- 4. **Emergent behavior**. The principle purposes of the SoS are fulfilled by behaviors that cannot be localized to any individual constituent system.
- **5. Geographical distribution**. The constituent systems only exchange information and not substantial quantities of mass or energy.



Maier, M. W. (1996). Architecting Principles for Systems-of-Systems. INCOSE International Symposium, 6(1), 565–573

Collaborative robotics

- Market size and growth
 - Industrial robotics market: USD 79.58 Billion by 2022
 - CAGR (Compound Annual Growth Rate) of 11.92% in 2016-2022.
 - Collaborative robots market: USD 3.3 Billion by 2022
 - CAGR of 60.04% in 2016-2022
 - Service robotics market: USD 23.90 Billion by 2022
 - CAGR of **15.18%** in 2016-2022.
 - Medical Robotics market: USD 12.80 Billion by 2021
 - CAGR of **21.1%** in 2015-2021.


Sources: www.eurogip.fr/en/eurogip-infos-news?id=4436; www.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/

Self-driving cars are here...



Single vehicle Autonomous Driving (AD) is here.


Worldwide car sales forecast by level of autonomy



Source: Canalys estimates, Autonomous Vehicle Analysis, December 2016







SafeCOP—ECSEL 2016-2019, 28 partners, 5 countries ~11 M€ EU budget, ~1,300 PMs

Safe Cooperating Cyber-Physical Systems (CO-CPS) using Wireless Communication


Objectives

- Develop a safety-assurance framework for CO-CPS.
- Develop a reference platform to support the engineering and certification of CO-CPS.
- Extend the current wireless protocols for safe & secure cooperation.
- Contribute to new standards and regulations.
- Demonstrate the usefulness of SafeCOP concepts in target applications.



Cooperative Open Cyber-Physical Systems (CO-CPS)





Safety-assurance framework for CO-CPS

- Now: standards and practice do not address CO-CPS
 - SafeCOP will influence practice and standards
- Impact & long-term effects:
 - Enabler for deployment of cooperative functions
 - Enabler for dynamic assurance/certification in general (e.g. for basic AD)
 - Assist in closing the gap between standards and technical development





ISO 26262 – "stress testing"



Automotive Systems & Functional Failure System Complexity, Fault Propagation & Analysis Fault Origination & Propagation Fault Analysis & Verification **Diversity of Failure** Systematic Hardware (HW) Failure Random HW Failure Systematic Software (SW) Failure /ehicle Level System System to Internal & External Faults Tight HW & SW Interaction component propagation Example 1: Falsified signal due to random HW failure in sensor -> faulty data properly processed by SW & distributed to vehicle system Example 2: Systematic SW failure in ECU Level signal processing algorithm causing falsification of original sensor signal and causing fault propagation up to system * Internal & External Faults Component to system level propagation Multi Level HW/SW Task Multi-level HW/SW analysis required Chip Level Integrated solution needed to analyze the impact of faults and to develop/verify safety concepts SYNOPSYS" Assolution © Synopsys 2013 5

Cooperative CPS are complex

 Unanticipated behaviours makes design-time safety assurance insufficient




 Run-time assurance required for acceptably safe cooperative functions (or even basic AD)

Autonomy followed by cooperative functions

- Increased customer and societal value
- Challenging from safety and security perspectives
 - Multiple stake-holders responsible for safety-critical functions
 - Dynamic configuration and "open" interfaces
- AD: Required to be Fail-Safe
- CF: Required to be Fail-Operational








Why increased importance?

- Cooperative functions in AD is still a few years into the future.
- On-going experiments with and standardization of e.g. cross-vendor platooning has started
- Safety-assurance/certification largely open problem



Key Co-CPS challenge

Safety-assurance is a potential show-stopper

 solutions are lacking (and/or are not commonly accepted or supported by standards)



Fatal Tesla Model S Crash While In Autopilot Triggers NHTSA Investigation

Tesla doesn't stop, 2 hitting the trailer and traveling under it

Safety is not enough!

 Security is receiving increased attention and public awareness/pressure.

The four main roadblocks holding up self-driving cars PROBLEM 3

SECURITY

It's one thing for a virus to cause your phone or laptop to crash, but if the same fate befalls a driverless car, the consequences will be much more dramatic.



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